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In Connectedness and Its Discontents,1 Dan Markel pays me the distinct
honor of critiquing my recent article, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal
Justice Interconnectedness.2 There, I examined the challenges faced by states as
they seek to apply their registration and recidivist enhancement laws to ex-
offenders who, having discharged their penal commitments, migrate to other states.
As I explained in Interconnectedness, states employ either an "internal" or
"external" approach in seeking continued accountability of such individuals, with a
variety of advantages and disadvantages accruing under each regime.
In the preceding pages, Professor Markel, while not "convinced that the
external approach is the obviously superior [approach]," takes me to task for
having purportedly overestimated its deficiencies.3 Unfortunately, while stated
with great eloquence, Professor Markel's assertions are off the mark. In the brief
space available here I will try to address each of his arguments and concerns.
I. HARSHNESS
Professor Markel first disputes that the external approach, compared to its
internal approach counterpart, is "unduly harsh." As he acknowledges, in
Interconnectedness I note that migrj offenders subject to the internal approach
very often experience harsher outcomes than they would under the external
approach.4 Focusing, however, on the reality that the external approach imports
what he calls "weird" normative positions of foreign states (e.g., tying registration
to "peeping" convictions or enhancing sentences based on low-level drug
convictions), Markel counters that "widen[ing] the scope of penality is not always
bad." 5 Citing laws codifying what he calls "progressive sensibilities," such as those
outlawing martial rape and enhancing sentences for bias-motivated crimes, 6 he
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makes the easy case that states can serve as laboratories of legal pluralism. 7
Interconnectedness, however, does not dispute this commonplace of federalism,
with its uneven bag of normative results.8 Indeed, as discussed below, a principal
shortcoming of the external approach is that it disavows and mutes pluralism and
the democratic processes from which it derives. 9
Professor Markel is thus correct that application of the external approach can
cut both ways: what one might consider progressive and/or retrograde norms are
potentially imported. However, this misses the two larger points made in
Interconnectedness. First, that the external approach has a distinctly un-
Brandeisian consequence: rather than allowing individual "experiments" to be
undertaken in isolation, "without risk to the rest of the country,"1° it reflexively
imports them (without individualized consideration of their normative merits) to
drive outcomes in the forum state. 1  The second point is that the external
approach, by applying both its own registration and enhancement criteria and those
of other states, ineluctably results in an expansion of governmental social control. 12
A harshening does indeed thus occur, and should prompt concern, but not
necessarily for the individualized instances Markel discusses. With adoption of the
external approach, a cumulative legal endoskeleton takes shape in the forum as
foreign state norms, whether "weird" or not,'3 are imported en masse.14 Moreover,
as I discuss in Interconnectedness, this aggregate is temporally and geographically
7 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8 See Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CrN. L. REv. 433, 448 (2002)
("The freedom of sub-national political communities to choose their own visions of the good society,
like any other form of 'diversity,' predictably results in a mixed bag of results.").
9 See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
10 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10,
at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (identifying as a central benefit of federalism its
capacity to allow extreme state policies to remain cabined in their place of origin).
I To Professor Markel, the external approach promotes intra-state experimentation because a
state will at once employ foreign and indigenous norms, allowing for comparative analysis. The
point is a fair and perceptive one; however, for reasons discussed below, a variety of compelling
reasons support the view that the internal approach, which assesses the impact of prior misconduct
through the forum state's own normative lens, is preferable.
12 In a footnote, Markel suggests that the external approach might permit states-wishing to
discourage "unwanted [ex-offender] migration"-to waive application of the forum's law and single
out newcomers for differential treatment, thereby avoiding legislative changes in the forum that
would increase sanctions for newcomer and indigenous populations alike. Markel, supra note 1, at
579 n.27; see also id. at text accompanying n.36 (arguing similarly). The possibility, however, again
ignores democratic pluralism and autonomy considerations, and fails to address broader inequality
concerns discussed below.
13 For instance, twenty-eight states require registration of individuals convicted of the strict
liability crime of statutory rape. See Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability
in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REv. 295, 325 (2006).
14 This aggregate is at once akin to, and builds upon, that which occurs when Congress
criminalizes conduct that states do not. Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 327 n.371.
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contingent, indiscriminately importing aspects of substantive criminal law, penal
norms, and procedures across time and space.'
5
II. DISPARITY
Professor Markel next disputes my contention that the external approach
creates troublesome disparities vis-h-vis both gmigrgs from foreign states and
6migrs and individuals indigenous to the forum. He does not deny that the
external approach creates such disparities but rather asserts that they are not in
themselves problematic, advancing two arguments in support. 16 First, Professor
Markel maintains that gmigrs in an external approach state are on notice that their
conviction history from their erstwhile home(s) will have mirror-image effect in
their new state, thereby dissolving any fairness concern. Markel is correct, as I
note in Interconnectedness, that notice is a prime benefit of the external
approach.17  It should go without saying, however, that advance notice of an
inequity in no way cures its disparate effect.
18
Professor Markel's second argument against what he calls the "veneer of
unfairness"' 9 is somewhat more persuasive. To his mind, when gmigrgs
experience a comparative disadvantage due to their foreign state conviction
history, this is justified because "[t]he predicate conduct was perpetrated against
different sovereigns whose democratic institutions may legitimately issue different
rules with different consequences. 2 °  While such a statement is of course
technically correct, it elides the reality that individuals-in the forum-are
subjected to distinct legal regimes resulting in different outcomes. As the
Minnesota Court of Appeals observed in applying its internal approach
enhancement law to reject consideration of a foreign juvenile conviction,
"defendants with similar criminal histories should not receive disparate treatment
depending on the age of majority of the state in which they committed prior
offenses.'
"5 Id. at 3 07-10.
16 Markel, supra note 1, at 578. As I note, the disparities present no basis for actionable equal
protection challenge as such, but rather create policy concern. Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at
311-12.
17 Whereas the internal approach often requires complex inter-state comparative legal
analysis, the external approach is simple and efficient, reflexively transplanting foreign norms and
outcomes to the forum. Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 288.
18 Cf RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14.6,
14.7, 17.4 (3d ed. 1999) (surveying distinctions between substantive and procedural due process).
19 Markel, supra note 1, at 579-80.
20 Id. at 579.
21 State v. Thomas, 374 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also State v. Bush, 9
P.3d 219, 222 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting external approach in order "to ensure that defendants
with equivalent prior convictions are treated the same way regardless of whether those prior
convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere."). Cf Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385
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Professor Markel's final assertion on the disparity issue-that the external
approach "actually serves the cause of equality because it ensures that similarly
situated defendants convicted in the same jurisdiction endure the same kind of
consequences regardless if one of the offenders decides to go to another
jurisdiction" 22 -is equally without merit. It is at once under-inclusive in that it
ignores other subject populations23 and serves to underscore the reality that
individuals are in fact being subject to a different corpus juris with consequent
disparity.
III. STATE AUTONOMY
Next, Professor Markel takes issue with yet another chief concern expressed
in Interconnectedness: that the external approach, by reflexively bootstrapping the
value judgments of other states, functions to abnegate state autonomy. To him,
adoption of the external approach actually amounts to an "expression of [state]
autonomy, rather than as a denigration of it" because it reflects a crime control
strategy predicated on inter-state deference and cornity.24 Such a view, however,
again ignores a basic functional reality of the external approach: by adopting en
masse the registration criteria and penal norms of other sovereigns, external
approach states surrender their criminal justice authority to others.25 With the
external approach, foreign norms are permitted to dictate outcomes in the forum, in
disregard of the forum's own democratically specified criminal justice norms,2 6
(2005) (rejecting consideration of foreign nation conviction to trigger U.S. felon-in-possession law
due to other nations' varied substantive laws, punishments and procedural protections).
22 Markel, supra note 1, at 580.
23 In particular, the comparative experience of migr~s from different states (not the same
state) and jmigros and indigenous individuals. Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 304-05.
24 Markel, supra note 1, at 580.
25 See State v. Langlands, 583 S.E.2d 18, 20 n.4 (Ga. 2003) ("A state cannot express its public
policy more strongly than through its penal code. When a state defines conduct as criminal and sets
the punishment for the offender, it is conveying in the clearest possible terms its view of public
policy." (quoting State v. Edmondson, 818 P.2d 855, 860-61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)); see also State v.
Clough, 829 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) ("The obvious purpose of [an internal approach
recidivist law] is to preclude the enhancement of a sentence if the conduct which led to a conviction
in another state has not been judged by our legislature to be so egregious... as to justify treating it as
a felony.").
26 As the Alaska Court of Appeals put it, "[tihe effect of a prior criminal conviction ... on the
sentencing of an Alaska offender implicates issues of policy that are uniquely Alaskan in character
and have nothing to do with California law." Mancini v. State, 904 P.2d 430, 432-33 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1995). See also People v. Laino, 87 P.3d 27, 37 (Cal. 2004) ("[T]he profile of the shadow that
conviction casts on later events is the business of the state where those later events occur.") (citation
omitted).
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forsaking what the Supreme Court has referred to as a foremost "prerogative[] of
sovereignty."
27
Professor Markel closes his autonomy-related discussion by advancing what
he sees as two additional justifications for adoption of the external approach. The
first is that a state might wish "to see its norms adhered to when its offenders
migrate to other states. 28 For reasons discussed in Interconnectedness, however,
scant reason exists to believe that states have any motivation whatsoever to be
mindful of how ex-offenders/residents fare in other states; they are simply likely to
be glad that they are "out of their hair."
29
Second, Professor Markel posits that states might embrace the external
approach because the internal approach allows states to be "free-riders"-"[t]heir
laws apply in their own jurisdiction and they also have their laws apply to their
own former citizens who migrate to external approach states.''3 ° Markel's
reference to free-ridership is oddly inverted, as it figures as a core criticism of the
external approach itself. As I noted in my prior article:
By deferring to the laws of other sovereigns, forum state officials
become free riders: they avoid any possible negative political
consequences that might attend enforcement of such laws in the first
instance in the forum... The external approach thus permits jurisdictions
to indulge in a kind of stealth legislation: laws are applied by the forum
without having been subject to the debate and compromise common to
the legislative process, depriving the public of an important occasion for
norm identification and support. While it might be the case that the
imported value judgment parallels that of the forum, this is not
necessarily so, and the stealth quality of the approach undercuts the
consensus-based (or at least majority-approved) value choices a formal
law embodies.
31
Nor, for similar reasons, do internal approach states engage in what Professor
Markel refers to as "law hoarding" as a result of having their laws apply in external
approach states. As noted above, and as Interconnectedness makes clear, hoarding
is actually a hallmark of the external approach: states augment their registration
and enhancement criteria by bootstrapping the laws of other states.
27 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) ("Foremost among the prerogatives of
sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal code."). Cf Lynn Baker & Ernest Young,
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 134 (2001) (extolling the
"negative freedom" of federalism-the right to act autonomously, free of the constraining authority
of other governmental units).
28 Markel, supra note 1, at 580-81.
29 Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 332.
30 Markel, supra note 1, at 581.
31 Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 322-23.
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IV. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AND
JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
Professor Markel's final contention is that the external approach best serves
the values of experimentalism and diversity ideally associated with federalism. In
support, he dwells on a point I acknowledge in Interconnectedness-that the
deferential quality of the external approach serves to validate and reify other states'
norms.32 However, as I make clear, this is only part of the story. For just as
adoption of the external approach only superficially serves state autonomy, 33 it
does not qualify as a substitute for actual democratic deliberation within the forum
on the particular norm in question.34 External approach states, rather than insisting
that their policies reflect individually legislated sovereign norms, merely "mimic
the value judgments of other states,, 35 and thus undermine governmental
transparency and political accountability by making it "difficult to ascribe value
judgments with geo-political accuracy. 3 6 Nor is the concern mitigated in any
principled way by Professor Markel's assertion that the "proportion of migrant
offenders is likely to be small compared to the number of indigenous offenders. 37
Even if his empirical assessment is correct, 38 transparency and accountability
remain undercut, as legislators in external approach states shirk their sovereign
democratic obligations.
Professor Markel next mistakenly asserts that the external approach does not
dampen exit rights and offers that "Logan thinks people should be able to commit
an offense and then escape (some of) the consequences of that conduct by moving
32 Id. at 320.
33 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
34 See Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 319-21; see also Ernest Young, The Rehnquist
Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 52 (2004) ("[S]tate governments cannot provide fora
for political participation and competition unless meaningful decisions are being made in those
fora.").
35 Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 321.
36 Id. at 322.
37 Markel, supra note I, at 581-82.
38 There is some question whether this is so. From March 1999-March 2000, for instance,
some eight million individuals in the U.S. general population changed state residences. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY RATES, BY TYPE OF MOVEMENT, 1947-2005 tbl.
A-1 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/tab-a-l.pdf. The
number of ex-offenders changing state residences is not currently known. However, it is
conservatively estimated that over a quarter of a million individuals subject to ongoing probation or
parole conditions live in states other than where their predicate conviction occurred, and hence
remain subject to the Interstate Compact on Adult Offender Supervision. See Interstate Commission
for Adult Offender Supervision, FAQ (March 8, 2007), at http://www.interstatecompact.orglabout/
faq/default.shtml. Given the transience of ex-offenders more generally, the number of individuals
"off paper" is likely quite high.
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to an 'easier' place to live."3 9 My article, however, plainly fails to support such an
inference. As I wrote, states are surely within their rights to hold migratory
offenders accountable for their past wrongs;40 the question addressed in
Interconnectedness is how this should occur: whether by means of express
sovereign decision or blind deference to other states' norms.
With the external approach, the latter is operative, and norms embodied in
foreign criminal convictions are permitted to inalterably affect future outcomes,
creating what I refer to as a "residual legal world,
' 4
' limiting prospects for exit.42
This concern is most pronounced with registration, where the external approach
requires that 9migr~s register in the forum if they were required to do so in their
erstwhile state residence, even if the forum's eligibility criteria would not require
registration for an indigenous offender. There is no mistaking that this method is
designed to discourage emigration (i.e., norm-evasion). However, this is precisely
the point: a foreign state norm (whether "weird" or not) is permitted to dictate
potentially life-long registration (and thus very likely community notification as
well), 43 triggering a replicating mass of "no-go" zones for individuals seeking to
avoid what they see as oppressive registration regimes. 44 And, because recidivist
and registration laws commonly date back many years, individuals become subject
to a "frozen in amber" effect that defies change and possible melioration by forum
state laws.45 Thus, more than merely "weird" state laws travel (as if this were not
39 Markel, supra note 1, at 583. Professor Markel adds that while persons who have served
their sentence and discharged their conditions of release should be free to migrate, he questions "by
what moral rights ... they merit a free roaming pass prior to their release from the criminal justice
system." Id. (emphasis added). I must confess to being confused over this, given that
Interconnectedness principally addresses individuals who have served their time and completed their
community release obligations.
40 Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 260-61.
41 Id. at 307.
42 Id. at 325 ("If prior convictions constitute indelible matters of record .... as is the case with
the external approach, geography is permitted to determine destiny-and individuals with such
records will naturally be less inclined to move .... [B]y in effect making laws more uniform, the
external approach discourages exit.").
43 For discussion of the onerous consequences of registration and notification, see Wayne A.
Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REv. 147, 182-207 (2000). Moreover,
because registration is typically tied to other restrictions, for instance limits on where registrants can
live, they too will apply in the forum state. See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and
Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1 (2006) (discussing registrant residence
exclusion zones enacted in twenty states and dozens of localities).
44 See, e.g., State v. Flowers, 92 Ark. App. 337 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (importing Louisiana's
registration requirement for conviction of commercial solicitation of oral sex between adults). The
common tendency of states to publicly identify registrants without specifying their qualifying
offenses, serving to lump together serious and non-serious offenders, heightens this concern. See,
e.g., David Hench, Panel to Consider Adding Details to Sex Offender List, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD
(Maine), July 23, 2006, at Al.
45 Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at 307-10.
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enough); a panoply of basic trappings of state penal norms do as well-again
without any individualized normative discernment in the forum.
46
Moreover, to assert, as Professor Markel does, that the external approach
imposes no "penalty" on migration, because it functions to "sustain[] the same
legal regime" as one travels from one state to another,47 misses the essential
promise of exit. As Seth Kreimer has argued, "state-by-state variation leaves open
the possibility to each individual of choosing to avoid repression by leaving the
repressive jurisdiction., 48 By carrying over a registration requirement, an external
approach state in effect prices emigration, requiring emigrants to internalize a
negative cost (one that does not apply to residents).49
It might be that an individual will change state residences in order to take a
superior job, despite the specter of having to endure a continued oppressive
registration requirement, as Professor Markel hypothecates. However, this does
not justify his conclusion that the emigrant is "indifferent" to the continued
oppression. 50  Such an economically based, rational-choice view ignores the
intrinsic value associated with freedom of choice in a decentralized system of
government such as ours. 5' Moreover, the view is oblivious to the reality that for
some the elimination of a less appealing option can have the opposite effect: they
will remain in an oppressive polity. In such situations, opportunity for exit and
freedom of choice are demonstrably lessened, as is the political signal potentially
sent to the home state by foot voting.
52
Professor Markel ends by offering that there exists a "quidpro quo among the
external approach states--one that Logan appears reluctant to acknowledge. 53 In
46 Markel offers that an external state resident, if troubled by the import of a "weird" law, can
take comfort in the fact that a similar law from her own state will be exported to other external
approach states. Markel, supra note 1, at 583. Aside from focusing wrongly on the general citizenry
(not emigrant ex-offenders), such a tit-for-tat dynamic highlights the reality that the external
approach reflexively enshrines and replicates problematic norms of other states. Markel also
reiterates that what he sees as progressive laws also travel. Id. However, to the extent this leavening
occurs, it neither meliorates external approach deference to "weird" individual laws nor responds to
the many doctrinal concerns addressed above.
47 Markel, supra note 1, at 582.
48 Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 66, 71
(2001).
49 Cf Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
50 Markel, supra note 1, at 582.
51 Cf Cynthia Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1385 (1998) (asserting that the "law-as-price" view of economic efficiency
"distill[s] all that is important about law and political obligation into economic terms" and
"evaporate[es] the moral component of law"); id. (observing that "[f]aw in a democracy is more than
a price tag.").
52 See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
53 Markel, supra note 1, at 584.
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fact, I acknowledge no such Golden Rule of reciprocity because none exists.
States adopting the external approach show no evidence of having consulted one
another in their choice, and the exclusivity of the club is regularly violated when
an external approach state is compelled to adopt the distinct norm of an internal
approach state.5 4 Moreover, it is not unusual for a given state to adopt the external
approach for registration and the internal approach for recidivist enhancement (or
vice versa),55 further belying existence of reciprocity. Nor, finally, does Professor
Markel's espoused safety valve for self-replicating oppressive state norms-
federal constitutional litigation 56-hold realistic promise. The Supreme Court has
long made clear its reluctance to impose constitutional limits on state substantive
criminal law norms57 and policies,58 including sex offender registration provisions
in particular.59
V. CONCLUSION
In concluding his critique, Professor Markel offers that the concerns I raise in
Interconnectedness possibly derive from a "skittishness" over the democratic
process vis-A-vis criminal law-making and the "purported crisis of
overcriminalization produced therefrom., 60 Here, he is substantially correct in his
assessment. However, in the final analysis, despite what may be taken as my
undue pessimism, Interconnectedness makes clear that it is the actual exercise of
democratic decision making (demonstrably absent from the external approach) that
is the modus operandi of choice as the nation grapples with the ongoing challenges
posed by emigrant ex-offenders.
54 Professor Markel observes that external approach states "worried about the injustices
potentially worked by replicating weird laws of other states" can specify that such laws will not be
considered. Id. at 584. Colorado's external approach recidivist law and California's external
approach registration law do just that, for foreign drug convictions and several specified less serious
sex offenses (e.g., indecent exposure), respectively. Interconnectedness, supra note 2, at at 276 n.92,
287 n.154. While certainly preferable to the paradigmatic external approach, such offense-specific
efforts can never capture the great diversity of state laws implicated, and altogether fail to shield
against the vast array of other factors causing concern (e.g., sentencing and procedural variations).
55 Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(e) (2003) (internal approach recidivist law) with
FLA. STAT. § 943.0435(1)(a)(2) (2003) (external approach registration law).
56 Markel, supra note 1, at 584.
57 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55
HAsTtNGs L.J. 509, 509 (2004) (noting that it "has become a commonplace that there are no
meaningful constraints on [state] criminal substantive criminal law.").
58 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (acknowledging the Court's
reluctance to sit as a "'superlegislature"' and "second-guess" state criminal justice policy choices).
59 See, e.g., Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (rejecting due process
challenge to state registration and community notification regime).
60 Markel, supra note 1, at 584.

